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ABSTRACT 
The method of Markov’s processes for the analysis of systems with 
constant bounce and recovery intensities considered. The article presents 
calculations of the failure probability of the system for describing the 
various cases of redundancy of its components using Markov’s models. 
Expressions obtained for calculating the approximate value of the failure 
probability of the system and analyzed of failures to improve the 
reliability of the system. The Markov’s graph of transitions in the 
reservation of the system, which reflects its behavior, described. 
Analysis of the results of numerical solution of systems shows that when 
loaded with redundancy, the probability of failure is higher than with 
partially loaded, and with partially loaded - higher than with unloaded 
backup. A tree of errors for the system of cooling and clearing of flue gas 
at the reservation made by replacing "2 of 3", which has seven minimum 
bounce cross sections. Calculated the probability of system failure. The 
obtained calculations allow to analyze failures of technical systems in 
order to increase the reliability of their functioning. 
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Introduction. A scientific approach to safety concerns requires a comprehensive analysis and 
classification of man-made accidents, major environmental and environmental factors, environmental 
behavior and personnel actions. Appropriate mathematical modeling methods and physical models of 
accident occurrence and development are required to address these issues. 
The reliability and security indicators of the system include quantitative reliability 
characteristics, which are introduced and determined according to the rules of statistical theory of 
reliability, probability theory and mathematical statistics. 
The choice of the method of reliability analysis of renewable redundant systems is largely 
determined by the class of the constructed reliability model. Currently, the main classes of models 
under study in reliability theory are independent event models, Markov and semi-Markov models. For 
their analysis, methods of probability calculation, methods of theory of Markov random processes, as 
well as methods based on the addition of differential equations are used. 
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Due to the comparative simplicity and clarity of the mathematical apparatus, the high 
probability and accuracy of the obtained decisions, Markov processes are of particular interest in risk 
assessment and design of decision support systems. 
Standard approaches for reliability are based on a probabilistic model, which is often 
inappropriate for tasks of this kind [1, 2]. Probability theory is often a complex and not intuitive 
approach, the result of which is difficult to analyze. Similarly, probabilistic analysis usually requires 
more information about the system than it is known about, for example, the distribution of failure rates 
[3]. Typically, this leads to false assumptions about the raw data. The probabilistic paradigm also has 
many limitations when applied to small-volume samples [4]. 
Analysis of the development of technical systems allows us to conclude that, despite the rapid 
development of such areas as systems theory, including theory of automatic control, theory of 
reliability, theory of security, to describe the behavior of complex systems of existing mathematical 
models and methods is not enough. This position is clearly reflected in the research of A.V. Akimova, 
M.A. Yastrebenetsʹkoho, H.M. Druzhynina [5-7]. Also, the risk of technical systems at different times 
was addressed by such researchers as M. Rasmussen, O.Renn, B.V. Hnedenko, I.A. Ryabinin et al. 
They noted that it was impossible to ignore this area of study of the security of technical systems. 
Approaches using failure trees and their varieties are well adapted to analyze the reliability of 
technical systems, but they are somewhat limited in application to real complex systems. 
Partial failures, coverage, system serviceability, and other important reliability issues are well 
covered by the failure tree analysis method [8]. An alternative to this approach is to use Markov 
processes. However, a review of their models showed that they were not sufficiently investigated in 
the problems of reliability of technical systems. 
Purpose of the study is to perform system failure calculations to describe the various cases of 
redundancy of its components using Markov models. Obtain expressions to calculate the approximate 
value of the system failure probability and analyze the failures to improve the reliability of the system. 
Research results. Consider the Markov process method for analyzing systems with constant 
failure rates and recoveries (  −  conditional failure flow rate,  −  conditional recovery flow rate). 
Let ( ) 1,x t =  if the component is inoperable and ( ) 0,x t =  if the component is inoperable. 
The following expression system can be used to determine the conditional failure rate: 
(1 0) Pr ( ) 1 ( ) 0 ;
(0 0) Pr ( ) 0 ( ) 0 1 ;
(11) Pr ( ) 1 ( ) 1 1 ;
(0 1) Pr ( ) 0 ( ) 1 ,
P x t t x t t
P x t t x t t
P x t t x t t
P x t t x t t




  +  = =  =  
  +  = =  = −  
  +  = =  = −  
  +  = =  =  
                                       (1) 
where Pr ( ) 1 ( ) 0x t t x t +  = =    is the probability that the failure will occur within the time interval 
t t+  , provided that the component is operable at time t , etc. 
Values (1 0), (0 0), (0 1)P P P  are called transition probabilities [9, 10] (transitions between 
states are shown in Fig. 1). 
 
 
Fig. 1. Markov state graph: 1 - working condition; 2 - inoperative condition 
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The probability of a system failure is the probability that ( ) 1.x t t+  =  This probability, in 
turn, can be expressed in terms of two possible states ( )x t  and corresponding transitions to the state 
( ) 1:x t t+  =  
     
 
( ) Pr ( ) 1 (1 0) Pr ( ) 0 (11) Pr ( ) 1
1 ( ) (1 ) ( ).
Q t t x t t P x t P x t
t Q t t Q t 
+  = +  = =  = +  = =
=   − + −   
 
The last equation can be rewritten as:  
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ).Q t t t t Q t Q t t Q t  +  =   −    + −     
From where do we find: 
( ) ( ) ,
dQ
Q t
dt
  = − + +                                                         (2) 
with the following initial conditions (0) 0.Q =  
Fig. 2 reflects the behavior of the system (the introduction into the system of additional 
elements in excess of the minimum required number), consisting of elements A and B [11]. Each 
rectangle in this figure reproduces one state of such a system. The leftmost cell in each of the 
rectangles is intended to indicate the spare component, the middle cell is to indicate the main 
component, and the rightmost cell is to indicate the component currently under repair. Therefore, 
rectangle 1 shows the state in which component B is the backup and component A is the principal. 
Similarly, rectangle 4 reproduces a state in which component B is the principal and component A is in 
repair. Possible state transitions in the figure are reproduced by arrows. Transitions from state 1 to 
state 3 and from state 2 to state 4 are characteristic only for partially loaded and loaded reservations; 
these transitions are not available for unloaded reservations. 
 
 
Fig. 2. Markov transition graph when booking 
In the case of partially loaded or loaded redundancy, it is assumed that the failure of the reserve 
components is characterized by a constant intensity .  In the case of a loaded reservation  , it is 
considered equal   to the failure rate of the main component. With unloaded redundancy   equals zero. 
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Special cases of partially loaded redundancy (0 <   < ) are unloaded redundancy (  = 0) and unloaded 
redundancy (  = ). The recovery rate of all components in the system is the same and equal  . For all 
types of redundancy considered above, the system is considered to have failed if it went to state 5. 
Denote by ( )iP t  the probability that the system is in a state i  at time t . The derivative of this 
probability is as follows: 
( )P t =  state transition rate i  - state transition rate 
j
i =   (intensity of transition from state j  
to state i )   probability of a state occurrence 
j
j −   (intensity of transition from state i  to state j )   
state probability i . 
The use of the expression given for the system under consideration makes it possible to 
construct the following system of differential equations: 
1 1 3
2 2 4
3 1 2 3 5
4 2 1 4 5
5 3 4 5
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) 2 ( )
P P t P t
P P t P t
P P t P t P t P t
P P t P t P t P t
P P t P t P t
  
  
    
    
  
= − + +
 = − + +
 = + − + +
 = + + + +
 = + −
                                        (3) 
The first equation in (3) reflects the fact that the intensity of the flow directed from state 3 to 
state 1 is equal μ, and the intensities of flows directed from state 1 to states 3 and 4, respectively, λ and 
?̅?. Similarly receive other equations. 
Suppose that the system under consideration at time zero is in state 1, that is, at time zero both 
components are operational, with component B in reserve and component A in operation. On the basis 
of this assumption, we can thus determine the initial conditions for differential equations (3): 
1(0) 1; (0) 0, 2,...,5iP P i= = =                                                   (4) 
Adding the first equation of system (3) with the second and third equation with the fourth, we obtain 
0
0 1
1
0 1 2
2
1 2
( ) ;
( ) ( ) 2 ;
2
dP
P P
dt
dP
P P P
dt
dP
P P
dt
  
    
 
= − + +
= + − + +
= −
                                              (5) 
with initial conditions 
0 1 2(0) 1; (0) (0) 0;P P P= = =  
where 
0 1 2 1 3 4 2 5( ) ( ); ( ) ( ); ( ).P P t P t P P t P t P P t= + = + =  
The system of differential equations (5) describes a system whose transition graph contains 
three states - (0), (1), and (2) (Fig. 3). The intensity of the transition stream coming out of state (0) is 
equal  + , and the intensity of the input stream is  . 
 
 
Fig. 3. A simplified Markov transition graph for system backup 
In Fig. 4 shows the dependence of the probability of failure of elements  
 ,A B  ( ( ) Pr( )Qr t A B= ) on time and numerically equal to the probability that both components 
A and B are in repair ( Qr −  curve partially loaded redundancy at values 𝜆 = 10−3𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟−1 ; 
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 ?̅? = 0,5 ∙ 10−3𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟−1 ; 𝜇 = 10−2𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟−1  curve QrN −  loaded state at values ?̅? = 10−3𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟−1 ; 
 𝜇 = 10−2𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟−1 ; curve QrNN −  unloaded redundancy at values  𝜆 = 10−3𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟−1;  ?̅? = 0 ; 
 𝜇 = 10−2𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟−1). Analysis of the results of the numerical solution of system (5) (
2( ) ( )Qr t P t= ) 
shows that the probability of failures is higher in the case of loaded redundancy than in the case of 
partially loaded and higher in the case of unloaded redundancy. 
We calculate the probability of failure of the system as a whole. We accept for the pumps of the 
cooling device of a failure rate 𝜆 = 10−3𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟−1 ; ?̅? = 0,5 ∙ 10−3𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟−1 ; 𝜇 = 10−2𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟−1  (partially 
loaded redundancy), and for pumps providing steam circulation in the gas purification column  
 𝜆 = 10−3𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟−1;  ?̅? = 0 ;  𝜇 = 10−2𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟−1 (unloaded redundancy). The failure and recovery rates for 
compressor C, water pump E and filter H are as follows 𝜆∗ = 10−4𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟−1, 𝜇∗ = 10−2𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟−1 
 
 
Fig. 4. Dependencies of the probabilities of failure of elements A and B on time 
The numerical solution of problem (5) gives the following values of failure probabilities (Table 1): 
 
Table 1. System failure probabilities 
t  100 500 1000 
( )Qr t  0,0028024 0,0064155 0,006479 
( )QrNN t  0,0018982 0,0044707 0,0045245 
( )Q t  0,0062948 0,0098375 0,0099006 
max( )sQ t  0,023585 0,040399 0,40705 
min( )sQ t  0,023372 0,039758 0,040055 
 
The failure rates for compressor C, water pump E and filter H can be calculated by the equation: 
 
*
* *
* *
( ) Pr( ) Pr( ) Pr( ) 1 exp ( ) .Q t C E H t

 
 
 = = = =  − − +  +
             (6) 
Dependence (6) is a solution of the differential equation (2) 
( ) ( ) ,
dQ
Q t
dt
  = − +  +                                                         (7) 
which describes a Markov graph of the states of the inability and inability of a component at constant 
values of the intensities of failures and recoveries [12]. 
Applying the Laplace transform, we have: 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) , ( ) ( ) .pQ p Q p Q P p
p p
 
   = − + + + + =  
where 
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 
( ) ,
( ) ( )
A B
Q p
p p p p

   
= = +
+ + + +
 
where 
( )Ap A Bp  = + + + . 
Solving the system 
0
( )
A B
A   
+ =

+ =
 
we find 
;A B
 
   
= = −
+ +
 
Finally we find 
 ( ) exp ( ) .
( )
Q p t
p p
 
    
 
     
•
•
+ +
= − → − − +
+ + + +
                       (8) 
The probability of system failure is generally calculated as: 
upper limit for rejection 
max( ) 3 ( ) ( ) ( ),sQ t Q t Qr t QrNN t=  + +                                               (9) 
the lower limit of failure 
2
min max( ) ( ) 3 ( ) 3 ( ) ( ) 3 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ).s sQ t Q t Q t Q t Qr t Q t QrNN t Qr t QrNN t= −  −   −   −     (10) 
Let us now consider a system where pumps of a cooling device are switched on in the scheme 
"2 of 3". Suppose that the failure rate of each of the cooling unit pumps is equal to   when the 
corresponding pump is in operation  and when it is in reserve. 
The transition graph for this system is shown in Fig. 5. Condition (0) corresponds to the situation 
when two pumps are in operation and one is in reserve. State (0) corresponds to three substations (1, 2, 3), 
each of which can go to state (1), and the intensities of the respective transitions are the same and make up 
2 + . The intensity of the transition from state (0) to state (1) is given by: 
1 2 3 1 2 3 0(2 ) (2 ) (2 ) (2 )( ) (2 )P P P P P P P         + + + + + = + + + = +  
This means that the intensity of the transition from state (0) to state (1) is equal to ( 2 + ), 
as shown in Fig. 5. The intensities of other transitions can be determined similarly. 
The transition graph shown in Fig. 5, the following system of differential equations [13] 
corresponds: 
0
0 1
1
0 1 2
2
1 2 3
3
2 3
(2 ) ;
(2 ) (2 ) ;
2 ( )
dP
P P
dt
dP
P P P
dt
dP
P P P
dt
dP
P P
dt
  
    
   
 
= − + +
= + − + +
= − + +
= −
                                        (11) 
under initial conditions 
0 1 2 3(0) 1; (0) (0) (0) 0.P P P P= = = =  
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Fig. 5. A simplified Markov transition graph for redundancy reservation according to the scheme "2 of 3" 
As a result of solving this system of differential equations, one can determine the probabilities 
of states. 
In order to be able to work, it is necessary that at least two of the three pumps of the cooling 
unit available are functional. Thus, the parameter value ( )rQ t  for the cooling system of the system 
under consideration, which is equal to the probability that "less than two cooling system pumps are 
operable", is given by the following expression: 
2 3( ) ( ) ( ).rQ t P t P t= +  
The numerical solution of problem (11) gives the following values of failure probabilities (Fig. 
6) (
3 1 3 2 110 ; 0,5 10 ; 10год год  − − − − −= =  = ). 
 
Fig. 6. Probabilities and system solutions (11) 
The error tree for the system of cooling and purification of fugitive gas during redundancy 
reservation according to the scheme "2 of 3" (Fig. 7) has seven minimum failure sections: 
             , , , , , , , , , , .C E H A B B D D A F G  
The upper and lower bounds of the system failure probability are: 
  ( ) Pr ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) .sQ t C E H A D B D D A F G=             (12) 
International Academy Journal Web of Scholar ISSN 2518-167X 
 
10 9(39), Vol.1, September 2019                                               
 
 
Fig. 7. Error tree for the cooling and purification system of the fugitive gas during redundancy 
reservation according to the scheme "2 of 3" 
Following the above methodology, we calculate the probability of failure of the system 
(Table 2). The probability of a system failure for a time of 1000 hours lies within 
0,0744064 ( ) 0,076274.sQ t   
 
Table 2. System failure probabilities 
t  100 500 1000 
2 ( )P t  0,011429 0,036325 0,038238 
3 ( )P t  0,000357 0,003330 0,003810 
( )rQ t  0,011786 0,039655 0,042048 
max( )sQ t  0,032569 0,073638 0,076274 
min( )sQ t  0,032169 0,071868 0,074406 
 
In the general case, substitution redundancy must satisfy the following conditions [14]: 
1. The chain contains n identical components. 
2. In order to ensure the link's performance, it is necessary that at least m of the link 
components be operable (1 m n  ). 
3. No more than r link components may be updated at any one time. 
The circuit of the scheme "m with n" is described by the following system of differential equations: 
0
0 0 1 1
1 1 1 1
1 1
;
( ) ;
,
k
k k k k k k k
n
n n n n
dP
P P
dt
dP
P P P
dt
dP
P P
dt
 
   
 
− − + +
− −
= − +
= − − + +
= − −
                                     (13) 
where 
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 
( ) , 0 ;
( ) , 1 1;
min , , 1 .
k
k
k
m n m k k n m
n k n m k n
r k k n
  
 
 
= + − −    −
= −  − +   −
=   
 
The value ( )rQ t  is calculated by the expression: 
1( ) ( ) ... ( ).r n m nQ t P t P t− += + +  
The system (5) discussed above is a separate case of system (13) at 2, 1, 2,n m r= = =  and 
system (11) a case of system (13) at 3, 2, 1.n m r= = =  
Conclusions.  
1. No complex system can have absolute security. However, society cannot allow the 
possibility of serious accidents when operating such systems. Therefore, one of the main tasks of 
science is the justification of quantitative security requirements and the creation of methods for 
calculating security systems with risk. 
2. The Markov Process Model is an adequate method for analyzing the fault tolerance of 
systems. This method works well with bounce trees - a well known tool for reliability. 
3. The obtained calculations of the approximate probability of failure of the system allow to 
analyze the failures of technical systems in order to improve the reliability of their functioning. 
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